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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, John Clark was found guilty of two felonies—burglary and
grand theft—for allegedly breaking into, and stealing from, a vacant residence and its
outbuildings.  As the State readily conceded below, its case against Mr. Clark was
purely circumstantial.
On appeal, Mr. Clark asserts there is insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions.  Specifically, he argues that evidence showing he went to the residence
and/or outbuildings after the  thefts,  coupled  with  his  presence  as  a  passenger  in  a
vehicle in which a portion of the stolen property was found, is insufficient for a
reasonable juror to conclude he had previously burglarized or stolen from those
structures.  He respectfully requests that this Court reverse both of his convictions.
Statement of the Facts1 and Course of Proceedings
Before he passed away in 2015, Gordon James owned property at 18982 West
Riverview, in Post Falls, Idaho.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.93, L.17 – p.94, L.23, p.127, Ls.4-17,
p.135, Ls.12-17, p.169, Ls.7-12.)2  On that property are a residence and some
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts relating to the alleged crimes are derived solely from
the trial transcript and exhibits.  Because Mr. Clark’s contention on appeal is that the
evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdicts, these are the most
relevant facts and these are the facts incorporated into, and relied upon, in his
substantive argument.
2 There are two different transcripts that comprise the Reporter’s Transcript in this
appeal.  The volume containing transcripts of the proceedings held on May 3 and 4,
2016 (including the trial) is referenced as “Tr. Vol. I,” and the volume containing
transcripts of the proceedings held on June 6 and 23, 2016 (including the sentencing) is
referenced as “Tr. Vol. II.”  Additionally, the transcript of Mr. Clark’s preliminary hearing
appears as an exhibit to the Clerk’s Record.  That transcript is not cited herein.
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outbuildings, including a shed and a barn.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.128, L.21 – p.129, L.19.)
Each of those structures contained personal property belonging to Mr. James and
certain members of his family.  (See Tr., p.128, Ls.4-5, 15-18.)
When Mr. James died, his family attempted to secure the Riverview property,
placing padlocks on the shed and barn doors, and locking up the house.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.132, Ls.10-16.)  They also visited periodically to keep the property up (e.g., mow the
lawn).  (Tr. Vol. I, p.28, Ls.6-18.)
On October 25, 2015, Buddy Crabbe, Mr. James’ granddaughter’s husband,
stopped by the Riverview property to get some tools out of the shed.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.149,
Ls.1-16.)  When he arrived, he noticed something suspicious—footprints around the
house in the fallen leaves—but he dismissed this evidence, assuming the footprints had
been left by another family member.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.149, Ls.17-23.)  At that time, the
padlock on the shed door was intact and, apparently, the house was secure, but
Mr. Crabbe did not check the lock on the barn door.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.149, L.24 – p.150,
L.6.)
Nine days later, on November 3, 2015, Mr. Crabbe returned to the Riverview
property.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.132, Ls.19-21.)  At that time, he noticed the padlocks had been
cut off the barn and shed doors, and the house had been broken into.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.132,
L.22 – p.133, L.16.)  Upon inspection, Mr. Crabbe discovered the contents of each of
those structures were in disarray, and that property was missing.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.133,
Ls.17-25.)
Mr. Crabbe and his wife, Katrina, called the police to report the break-in.  (Tr. Vol.
I, p.134, Ls.1-11.)  Later that night, they returned to the Riverview property with their six
3
children to create a “presence” and thereby dissuade any from burglarizing the home or
outbuildings.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.12 – p.135, L.11, p.156, Ls.9-17.)  They
apparently turned lights on, set up a new spotlight on the shed, and sat in their car in
the driveway.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.14 – p.135, L.3, p.156, Ls.21-23.)
Shortly after midnight (approximately 12:30 a.m. on November 4, 2015), the
Crabbes saw an SUV approach on the road.  (Tr., Vol. I, p.135, L.11 – p.136, L.2,
p.157, Ls.8-13.)  It “slowed way down,” but initially drove past the property.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.135, L.24 – p.136, L.2, p.157, Ls.10-13, 19-20.)  Moments later, it came back and
pulled into the driveway.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.2-4, p.157, Ls.21-24.)  Mr. Crabbe turned
his headlights on and the SUV backed out of the driveway and left.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136,
Ls.4-6, p.157, Ls.24-25.)  However, the SUV turned around a short distance away and
came back, pulling into the driveway a second time.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.7-10, p.157,
L.25 – p.158, L.2.)  At that point, Mr. Crabbe turned his engine, as well as his
headlights, on.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.10-13.)  The SUV left again.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136,
Ls.21-22, p.158, Ls.2-3.)  However, once more the SUV turned around and came back.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.136, Ls.22-23, p.158, Ls.2-6.)  This time, the SUV maneuvered on the road
with its headlights, as well as a second light source held outside the passenger’s
window (a flashlight or headlamp with a blueish glow), pointed at the Crabbes’ car,
before driving into the driveway for a third time.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, L.24 – p.138, L.3,
p.158, Ls.4-9.)  This time, the SUV drove up the driveway toward the Crabbes’ car.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.138, Ls.1-3, p.158, Ls.8-9.)  Mr. Crabbe responded by driving toward the
SUV, as if in a game of “chicken.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.138, Ls.5-6.)  This tactic worked, as the
SUV once more backed out of the driveway and left, this time for good.  (Tr. Vol. I,
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p.138, Ls.6-14.)  As this was going on, Mrs. Crabbe was on the phone with the police.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.138, Ls.15-18, p.160, Ls.20-21.)
Deputy Brice LaBelle responded to Mrs. Crabbe’s call.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.93, Ls.9-20.)
While en route to the Riverview property, Deputy LaBelle stopped an SUV fitting the
description provided by Mrs. Crabbe.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.93, L.21 – p.94, L.3.)  The driver
was Andrea Evitts, and the passenger was John Clark.3  (Tr. Vol. I, p.95, Ls.10-21,
p.121, Ls.3-4.)  In a subsequent search of the SUV4 and Mr. Clark’s person, police
found a number of items which had come from the Riverview property.  At trial, those
items were detailed as follows:
∑ Mr. Crabbe’s headlamp, which had come from the residence, but was
found on the passenger-side floorboard of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I, p.102, Ls.6-
8, p.139, L.20 – p.140, L.7);
∑ Katrina Crabbe’s bank card, which had come from the shed, but was
found in the center console of the SUV, (Tr. Vol. I, p.103, L.25 – p.104,
L.18, p.142, Ls.9-15);
∑ A number of Gordon James’ financial transaction cards, which had come
from the barn, but were found in the center console of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I,
p.104, L.23 – p.105, L.17, p.142, Ls.16-24);
3 The jurors were not  told who owned the SUV, but  they were informed that  Mr.  Clark
was not the owner.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.120, Ls.13-17.)
4 Although the jury did not hear why the SUV was searched, it turns out there was a
warrant for Ms. Evitts’ arrest.  (R., p.10.)  And, because Mr. Clark did not have a valid
driver’s license, the vehicle could not be released to him.  (R., p.10.)  Instead, it was
impounded and inventoried.  (R., p.10.)
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∑ Cards belonging to Mr. Crabbe, including a driver’s license and “other
bank cards,” which had come from the shed, but were found in the center
console of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I, p.106, Ls.4-18, p.142, L.25 – p.143, L.7);
∑ Mr. James’ military medals and ribbons, which had come from the barn,
but were found in the glove box of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I, p.107, Ls.2-25,
p.143, Ls.8-15);
∑ Mr. Crabbe’s silver padlock, which had come from shed, but was found in
the center console of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I, p.111, L.18 – p.112, L.5, p.143,
L.17 – p.144, L.4);
∑ A number of Mr. Crabbe’s old license plates, which had come from the
shed, but were found in “the back” of the SUV5 (Tr. Vol. I, p.112, L.17 –
p.113, L.16, p.144, Ls.5-18);
∑ A red ledger belonging to Mr. James, which had come from the barn, but
was found in the back seat of the SUV (Tr. Vol. I, p.114, L.4 – p.115, L.19,
p.144, L.19 – p.145, L.1);
∑ A small toolbox with miscellaneous tools belonging to Mr. Crabbe, which
had come from the shed, but was found in the back seat of the SUV
(Tr. Vol. I, p.115, L.23 – p.116, L.4, p.144, L.21 – p.145, L.3); and
∑ A screwdriver, supposedly belonging to Mr. Crabbe and which had
supposedly come from the small toolbox taken from the shed, but was
found in Mr. Clark’s pocket (Tr. Vol. I, p.99, Ls.13-21, p.102, Ls.9-19,
p.140, L.20 – p.141, L.11).
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Police did not find in the SUV (or anywhere else) certain other property reported as
missing by the family—for example, a valuable silverware set and six to eight boxes of
model trains and related equipment.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.147, L.24 – p.148, L.25.)
Police also recovered from the SUV (mostly from the passenger-side floorboard)
certain other items—a hammer, black gloves, “shaved” keys,6 and a flashlight.  (Tr. Vol.
I, p.99, L.24 – p.100, L.7, p.102, Ls.20-25, p.103, Ls.16-18; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.141,
L.14 – p.142, L.142 (Mr. Crabbe denying ownership or knowledge of these items))—
which it wished for the jury to believe were burglary tools or instruments (see Tr. Vol. I,
p.194, Ls.5-11).
According to Deputy LaBelle, when Mr. Clark was first questioned “about the
situation,” Mr. Clark “said he was out for a drive on Riverview.  It was a
misunderstanding, the whole circumstance was a misunderstanding.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.118,
Ls.6-13.)  According to Deputy LaBelle, when he spoke to Mr. Clark a second time (after
the SUV was searched) “about the same circumstances, about the property,” “Initially
he [Mr. Clark] said that he didn’t know anything about it.  And then briefly after he said
that the items found might have been found in a garbage sack along Riverview they’d
discovered earlier in the say.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, L.14 – p.119, L.8.)
Ms. Evitts and Mr. Clark were both arrested.  (R., p.10.)  The record does not
reveal Ms. Evitts’ original charges, but Mr. Clark was originally charged with two counts
of burglary and two counts of grand theft, as well as a persistent violator enhancement.
5 It is unclear whether, when Deputy LaBelle spoke of “the back” of the SUV in this
context, he was referring to the back seat or the hatch area.
6 Deputy LaBelle never explained what a “shaved” key is, much less how it could have
in any way facilitated a burglary of the Riverview property.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.103, Ls.7-
15.)
7
(R., pp.37-39.)  Following a consolidated preliminary hearing, both Ms. Evitts and
Mr. Clark were bound over on three counts of burglary (one for each the residence, the
shed, and the barn) and one count of grand theft (for taking a financial transaction card
belonging to Mr. James).  (Prelim. Tr., p.67, L.21 – p.68, L.5.)  And Ms. Evitts was
bound over on additional felony count for possession of methamphetamine.  (Prelim.
Tr., p.68, Ls.5-8.)
Prior to Mr. Clark’s trial, Ms. Evitts pled guilty to “grand theft and burglary and
possession of methamphetamine from the same facts stemming from this incident,” and
received a sentence which included a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.14,
L.22 – p.15, L.1.)  In Mr. Clark’s case, the State moved to preclude the defense from
referencing Ms. Evitts’ convictions (as well as the existence of an outstanding warrant
for her arrest).  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.6.)  That motion was denied in
relevant part, with the district court explaining as follows:
I do think it’s relevant that another person was involved.  I do think
the defense has the ability and the right to point the finger, as [defense
counsel] said, to somebody else….
I’m not going to bar testimony about the other person who was
driving the vehicle or their identity or the fact that they were found guilty or
pled guilty of the theft-related offense arising out of this incident.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.8-20.)  Thus, at Mr. Clark’s trial, the jury heard that Ms. Evitts “pled
guilty as a result of the charges that arose out of that stop against her.”  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.121, Ls.5-8; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.198, Ls.12-18 (defense’s closing, arguing Ms. Evitts
was the one who had committed the burglary).)
After the jury heard the evidence described above during the State’s case-in-
chief, Mr. Clark moved, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29, for an acquittal.  (Tr. Vol. I,
p.171, L.10 – p.174, L.11.)  The district court, however, denied that motion.  (Tr. Vol. I,
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p.176, Ls.2-15.)7  Following approximately five hours of deliberations, the jury found
Mr. Clark guilty of both burglary and grand theft.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.208, L.4 – p.212,
L.20.)
Following sentencing (see Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.9-17; R., pp.154-58), Mr. Clark filed
a notice of appeal that was timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction (see
R., pp.161-63).  On appeal, he contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to
sustain either of his convictions.
7 Following the trial, Mr. Clark renewed his Rule 29 motion.  (R., p.146.)  However, that
motion was never heard or decided by the court.  (See Tr. Vol.2, p.4, L.9 – p.6, L.21
(vacating the hearing set on the Rule 29 motion in order to provide the defense more








The State Failed To Offer Evidence Sufficient To Sustain Mr. Clark’s Convictions For
Burglary Or Grand Theft
A. Introduction
The trial evidence showed that Mr. Clark went to the Riverview property after that
property had already been burglarized, while riding as a passenger in a vehicle in which
a portion of the stolen property was found, and that the driver of the vehicle ultimately
pled guilty and took responsibility for the crimes committed.  On appeal, he contends
this evidence was insufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude he was involved in the
original burglary or thefts, and so his convictions must be reversed.
B. Applicable Legal Standards
As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, “[t]he principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.” Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
Intertwined with this presumption of innocence, “[t]he requirement that guilt of a criminal
charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early
years as a Nation.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).  “The reasonable-doubt
standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.  The standard
provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic
and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.’” Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.)  Thus,
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both the presumption of innocence and the “reasonable doubt” standard are mandated
by the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Winship, 397
U.S. at 364; see Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.
The finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is within the province of the jury,
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair jury trial.  As the Supreme Court
has held:
It is self-evident ... that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury
verdict are interrelated.   It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have
a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up
to the judge to determine (as Winship requires) whether he is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, the jury verdict required by
the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (emphasis and parenthetical in original).
Despite the many procedural safeguards built into our criminal justice system, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict
even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt ….” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).  “Under Winship,
… it follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally
stand.” Id. at 317-18.  Thus,
After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction must be … to determine whether
the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.  But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S., at 282, 87 S.Ct., at 486
(emphasis added).  Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S., at 362, 92 S.Ct.,
at 1624-1625.  This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of
the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
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facts.  Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the
factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal
conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered
in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  The criterion thus impinges
upon “jury” discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the
fundamental protection of due process of law.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted).
In light of the foregoing, the Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that
the State is constitutionally-required to present evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the question of whether the State has met that burden is
reviewable on appeal. See State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545 (2015).  With regard to
the standard of review, it has held as follows:
The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether “after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417,
432 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)) (emphasis in original).
Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546.  This question is reviewed de novo. Id.
C. The State Failed To Offer Evidence Sufficient To Sustain Mr. Clark’s Burglary Or
Grand Theft Convictions
The evidence adduced at trial8 was  that  Mr.  Clark  was  a passenger in vehicle
containing stolen property from a previously-burglarized residence/barn/shed (i.e., the
Riverview property), and that the vehicle was heading to the Riverview property in the
middle of the night with possible burglary tools/instruments onboard.  Based on this
evidence, the State asked the jurors to infer (and, indeed, they did infer) that Mr. Clark
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must have been involved in the burglary and theft at some earlier time.  However, this
inference is not one that could be drawn by a rational juror and, thus, Mr. Clark’s
convictions cannot stand.
The jury was presented with no direct evidence linking Mr. Clark to the burglary
(or burglaries) or theft(s).  No video recordings placed him at the Riverview property
during the crime(s)9; no forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprints or DNA) placed him at the
Riverview property during the crime(s); no witnesses (e.g., Ms. Evitts) ever placed him
at the Riverview property during the crime(s); and Mr. Clark never made any statements
placing himself at the Riverview property during the crime(s) or otherwise taking
responsibility for their commission.  Thus, the State’s evidence against Mr. Clark was
purely circumstantial.
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may, in some cases, be sufficient to sustain
guilty verdicts. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712 (2009).  But such evidence
may only sustain guilty verdicts when it “gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt.” Id.
(emphasis added).  In this case, any inference of guilt gleaned from the circumstantial
evidence was wholly unreasonable.
Mr. Clark was found in a vehicle containing some of the property stolen from the
Riverview property.  But that SUV was not his, and he was not driving it.  These facts
8 The trial evidence was detailed in the above Statement of the Facts.  Rather than
repeating all of the evidence as part of his argument, Mr. Clark incorporates herein his
recitation of the evidence by this reference.
9 As noted in the above Statement of the Facts, no one knows when the crimes were
actually committed.  It appears they must have occurred sometime after October 25,
2015, when Buddy Crabbe was at the Riverview property and saw footprints, but
observed no signs of forced entry, and November 3, 2015, when Mr. Crabbe saw
obvious signs of a burglary.
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raise the inference that Mr. Clark was not the one who put the stolen property in the
SUV. Cf. State v. Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 506-07 (1990) (holding that non-owner
passengers do not have “standing” to challenge searches of vehicles, and implicitly
recognizing that owners and drivers have greater dominion and control over vehicles
than mere passengers).  Further, most of the stolen property was found in the common
areas of the SUV (i.e., the center console, the backseat, and “the back”) or an area
presumably under the exclusive control of the owner or driver (i.e., the glove box).
Since proximity alone is insufficient to raise an inference of guilt, see State v. Warden,
97 Idaho 752, 754 (1976) (rejecting the notion that mere proximity to illegal drugs
proves possession of those drugs), the mere fact that Mr. Clark was in someone else’s
vehicle with some stolen property, standing alone, proves nothing.
Having said that, because Mr. Clark had actual possession of one item of
allegedly stolen property (the screwdriver), and may have used another (the headlamp),
he concedes a reasonable jury could have inferred he had joint control over the rest of
the stolen property. See id. (recognizing proximity, coupled with “other circumstances,”
may support a conviction for possession).  Thus, a reasonable jury could have inferred
that Mr. Clark was in possession of stolen property and, given the circumstances of his
and Ms. Evitts’ attempts to drive up to the Riverview property on the night of November
3-4, 2015, a jury could reasonably have inferred he was in possession of that property
under circumstances which would reasonably lead him to believe that property was
stolen.  But Mr. Clark was not charged with, or convicted of, grand theft by possession
of stolen property under Idaho Code section 18-2403(4); rather, he was charged with,
and convicted of, grand theft for taking, obtaining, or withholding property from its owner
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(or aiding and abetting another in doing so) with the “intent to deprive another of
property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person” under section 18-
2403(1).  (See R., pp.97-98 (second amended information), pp.114-18 (jury instructions
on the elements of grand theft).)  So any inference that Mr. Clark committed the crime of
grand theft by possession is insufficient, in and of itself, to prove that he actually
committed the crimes with which he was charged in this case—entering the house,
barn, and/or shed with the intent of committing a theft (burglary), or actually taking the
financial transaction card at issue (grand theft).
The question then is whether a reasonable jury, after inferring Mr. Clark was in
possession of the property stolen from the Riverview property, could use that inference
to further infer that he was also the one who broke into the house, barn, and shed on
the Riverview property and stole the items in the first instance.  Mr. Clark recognizes
that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that “the unexplained possession of recently
stolen property raises an inference of guilt and may be enough by itself to justify a
conviction of burglary.” State v. Ponthier, 92 Idaho 704, 705 (1969); see also Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 (1973) (holding that possession of stolen property,
coupled with “no plausible explanation for such possession consistent with innocence,”
is sufficient evidence to infer the defendant knew that property was stolen).  However,
the unique circumstances of this case render such an inference unreasonable here.
First, it would constitute a second inference heaped upon the first inference that
Mr. Clark was even in possession of the stolen property.  Such an inference based upon
another inference is unreasonable. Cf. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 467 (2015)
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(rejecting as unreasonable an appellate argument that “would require inference upon
inference”).
Second, and more importantly, because Ms. Evitts pled guilty and admitted her
involvement in burglarizing the Riverview property, Mr. Clark had a very plausible theory
of defense that undermined the State’s double-inference of Mr. Clark’s guilt.
Specifically, given that Ms. Evitts was the driver of an unnamed third person’s SUV, and
had already pled guilty to the crimes for which Mr. Clark was on trial, Mr. Clark
reasonably suggested Ms. Evitts acted alone (or perhaps with an accomplice other than
Mr. Clark) in burglarizing the Riverview property.10  Under Barnes, therefore, any
inference of guilt of burglary and theft by taking, based solely on subsequent
possession of stolen property, was unreasonable.  Indeed, in order for the jury to have
found Mr. Clark guilty, it would have had to have either:  (a) completely disregarded the
undisputed fact that Ms. Evitts pled guilty (assuming it found Mr. Clark acted alone), or
(b)  simply  assumed  that  because  Mr.  Clark  was  with  Ms.  Evitts  on  the  night  of
November 3-4, 2015, he must also have been her accomplice whenever she committed
10 For example, the defense argued as follows in closing:
Mr. Clark is not charged with any crime for pulling into that driveway
as a passenger in a vehicle that the State doesn’t know who owned.  They
certainly cannot say that Mr. Clark owned or that he’d ever been in that
vehicle until that night.  And Deputy LaBelle said, “Well, Andrea Evitts pled
guilty to crimes arising out of this.”  She was the driver.  She committed
the burglary….
….
There’s Andrea Evitts taking Mr. Clark up the driveway, “Oh who
are these people?”  And she splits.  They get pulled over.  She pleads
guilty.  And now Mr. Clark is defending himself in this circumstantial case.
It requires more guesswork than reasonable doubt allows.  Reasonable
doubt allows no guesswork.  You can’t go into the jury room and just make
an assumption.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.198, L.8 – p.199, L.12.)
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the burglary/thefts.  The former is an unreasonable theory because it would require the
jury to have wholly disregarded completely uncontradicted evidence. And the latter is an
unreasonable theory because it would have required the jury to speculate wildly.  “It is
well established that an inference would be unreasonable if it would permit a jury to
base its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture.” Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho
441, 448 (1979).
In short, evidence establishing only that Mr. Clark was a passenger in someone
else’s vehicle, in which stolen property was found, as the admitted thief drove that
vehicle back to the scene of the crime after the fact, is not sufficient for a reasonable
jury to have found that Mr. Clark participated in the original burglary and theft.
CONCLUSION
Because the State failed to offer sufficient to sustain Mr. Clark’s burglary or grand
theft convictions, he respectfully requests that both of those convictions be reversed,
and that his case be remanded to the district court with an instruction that acquittals be
entered.
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